The Supreme Court has ruled against the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) broad interpretation of a federal statute used to prosecute a former police officer involved in the Capitol riot on January 6, 2021. In a landmark 6-3 decision in Fischer v. United States, the justices determined that Joseph Fischer should not have been charged with “obstruction of an official proceeding” under the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act. This statute has been the DOJ’s go-to for charging over 300 defendants with felonies since the riot, with potential prison sentences of up to 20 years.
Chief Justice John Roberts, writing for the majority, emphasized that to prove a violation under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the government must show that the defendant impaired the availability or integrity of records, documents, or other items used in an official proceeding. Roberts warned that the DOJ’s expansive interpretation of the law could criminalize a wide range of ordinary conduct, potentially subjecting activists and lobbyists to decades in prison.
This ruling has significant implications beyond the hundreds of defendants prosecuted after January 6, as they now have grounds to appeal the most common felony charge from the riot. It also affects two out of four charges against former President Donald Trump, filed by Special Counsel Jack Smith, which are likely to be dropped or invalidated following this Supreme Court decision.
Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson joined the five conservative justices in the majority decision with a concurring opinion. She agreed that the statute does not encompass all forms of obstructive conduct but is instead limited by the preceding list of criminal violations. Jackson noted that it is unlikely Congress intended for subsection (c)(2) to create a broad federal obstruction crime given that no similar law has been passed before.
In her dissent, Justice Amy Coney Barrett argued that the federal government correctly applied the “obstruction” terms to defendants charged with crimes related to the Capitol events. She acknowledged that while the 1512(c)(2) provision is broad and not initially aimed at events like January 6, statutes often extend beyond their original scope, and adherence to the text is necessary under statutory interpretation rules.
Julie Kelly, who has extensively covered the January 6 trials, pointed out that Barrett’s dissent mirrors the arguments of DC judges who claim that the Capitol disturbance was so unprecedented that Congress could not have envisioned such an event, thereby justifying the application of 1512(c)(2).
This Supreme Court decision represents a significant check on the DOJ’s prosecutorial reach and underscores the importance of adhering to the original intent and limitations of federal statutes. It reinforces the judiciary’s role in ensuring that the law is applied as written, not stretched to fit political agendas.
